Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 2

Article 2

Spring 2018

Bold Executive Action and False Equivalence
Stephen H. Legomsky
Washington University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the American Politics Commons, Immigration Law Commons, and the President/
Executive Department Commons
Recommended Citation
Legomsky, Stephen H. (2018) "Bold Executive Action and False Equivalence," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 23 : Iss. 2 ,
Article 2.
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol23/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams
University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Articles
Bold Executive Action and False
Equivalence
Stephen H. Legomsky*

Amidst the legal and political discourse following President
Obama’s immigration executive actions and the polar opposite
thrust of President Trump’s executive actions in this field, one
hears a familiar refrain—a dire warning to liberals that zealous
advocacy of humane immigration policies will come back to haunt
us. Liberal executive actions in this field, it is said, set broader
legal and political precedents and trigger conservative backlashes
that open the door to anti-immigrant and other illiberal executive
actions. Seeing no evidence of such a causal link, I disagree. To
the contrary, the steady, principled advocacy of humane
immigration policies is critical to the realization of positive
outcomes and the defeat of harmful ones.
These arguments have come from both directions. From the
political right, they are meant to justify bold anti-immigrant
executive action. These advocates cite DACA (Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals)1 and DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of
* The John S. Lehmann University Professor Emeritus, Washington
University School of Law. Thanks are owed to Peter Margulies, the Roger
Williams University School of Law, and the student editors of the Roger
Williams University Law Review.
1. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President on
Immigration
at
the
Rose
Garden
(June
15,
2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-
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Americans)2 as legal or political precedent for broad executive
power. Additionally, they try to undermine immigrant advocates
by pointing to our support of DACA and DAPA and thus accusing
us of doing 180-degree turns now that the shoe is on the other
foot. From the political left, the warnings are meant as a caution
against overly bold progressive executive action that they fear
might lend support to future conservative action.
In 2012, the Obama Administration established a program
known as “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals” (DACA).3 The
program authorized “deferred action,” a long-established vehicle
for prosecutorial discretion,4 for certain undocumented
immigrants who had been brought to the United States as
children. They had to apply individually, to have lived
continuously in the U.S. since 2007, to meet several additional
criteria, and to show they merited the favorable exercise of
discretion.5 When granted, deferred action temporarily makes the
recipient a low priority for deportation and eligible to apply for
permission to work during the temporary period for which
deferred action is granted.6 On September 5, 2017, the Trump
president-immigration; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs &
Border Prot., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
2. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals
Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain
Individuals Who are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_
memo_deferred_action.pdf.
3. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, supra note
1.
4. For a superb, comprehensive historical account of deferred action
and related instruments of prosecutorial discretion, see SHOBA SIVAPRASAD
WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN
IMMIGRATION CASES (2015), especially ch. 4; see also Leon Wildes, The
Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 819 (2004).
5. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, supra note
1, at 1.
6. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014).
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Administration rescinded DACA.7
In 2014, the Obama Administration established a second
program known as “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans”
(DAPA).8 This program authorized deferred action, again after
individualized consideration, for certain parents of United States
citizens and lawful permanent residents.9 A divided court of
appeals panel preliminarily enjoined DAPA,10 and on June 15,
2017 the Trump Administration rescinded it.11
The idea that pro-immigrant executive action rests on
premises that will later support anti-immigrant executive actions
has surfaced in at least three contexts: legal precedent, political
norms, and public backlash. In each of these contexts the critics
argue that, by supporting President Obama’s executive actions or
other inclusive immigration policies, we liberals are now hoisted
by our own petards. Not all of these critics have made all of these
arguments. But each of these arguments has been made by one or
more individuals, as the following discussion will show.
I.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

The common premise of the arguments addressed in this
section is the need for consistency—in particular, the need to
avoid double standards. In a thoughtful article on judicial review
of the political branches’ immigration policymaking, Professor
Margulies considers the division of power between the legislative
and executive branches of government.12 One of his observations
7. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandumrescission-daca.
8. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson to León Rodríguez, supra
note 2.
9. Id. at 4.
10.
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d
per curiam mem. by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
11.
Memorandum for the President from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., to Stephen Miller, Assistant to the President & Senior
Advisor to the President for Policy, on Rescinding Policy Providing for
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA) 1 (June 15, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications
/2017-HQFO-00935%20Records.pdf.
12.
See Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial

332 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:329
is highly relevant here: “A model that views President Obama as a
co-principal of Congress can hardly deny that role to President
Trump.”13
At that level of generality there is no reason to quibble. As
usual, however, the devil is in the details. Reasonable minds can
disagree as to whether a given assertion of executive authority
really amounts to making the executive a “co-principal of
Congress.”14 More important, bold executive actions are not
fungible. They rest on different sources of law, different sets of
facts, different policy goals, and different cost-benefit analyses.
DACA and DAPA are bold executive actions that relate to
immigration; so too are President Trump’s travel ban15 and his
orders rescinding DACA and DAPA.16 That much they have in
common. But the resemblance ends there. The legal issues are as
different as night and day, as discussed in more detail below.17
Whether any one of these actions can fairly be described as
elevating the executive branch to the role of “co-principal of
Congress,”18 therefore, or for that matter whether any one of these
is legally flawed, tells us nothing about whether the same is true
of any of the others.
In a series of similarly thoughtful writings, Professor
Blackman specifically targets DACA supporters and the parties
challenging President Trump’s travel ban.19 Blackman claims
that their current legal challenges to President Trump’s executive
actions contradict the arguments they previously made in
defending the legality of pro-immigrant policies.20 In one article
Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration (Roger Williams
Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 177, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029655.
13. Id. at 6 n.23.
14. Id.
15. The current versions are Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg.
45,161, 45,164–71 (Sept. 27, 2017) (nationals of specified countries) and Exec.
Order No. 13,815, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,055 (Oct. 24, 2017) (refugees).
16. See Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke to James W. McCament,
supra note 7; Memorandum from John F. Kelly to Stephen Miller, supra note
11.
17. See infra notes 36–44 and accompanying text.
18. Margulies, supra note 12, at 6 n.23.
19. See Josh Blackman, Commentary, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG,
http://joshblackman.com/blog/c-v/#commentary (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
20. Josh Blackman, A Ludicrous Ruling That Trump Can’t End DACA,
NAT’L REV. (Jan. 10, 2018, 4:57 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/
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Blackman argues that “[i]mmigration advocates who ignore this
venerable maxim [that Congress does not ‘hide elephants in
mouseholes’] will have scant protection if future presidents
exercise discretion that is less congenial to their desired
reforms.”21 This was a reference to the use of that maxim in the
court decision affirming a preliminary injunction of DAPA.22 As I
have shown elsewhere, however, the provision in question was no
mousehole.23 Even if it were, a future challenge to an antiimmigrant executive action would rest on the specific provisions of
law relevant to that case. Unless the legal issues happened to be
identical, a “mousehole” argument in one case would not support
Professor Blackman’s dark forecast of “scant protection”24 in
another case.
Elsewhere, Professor Blackman mocks the State of
Washington for “rel[ying] on the standing argument it once
opposed [referring, presumably, to the defendants’ and amicus
states’ arguments that Texas lacked standing to challenge DAPA]
to seek a nationwide injunction against Trump’s executive
order.”25 But the State of Washington hardly relied on any

01/daca-court-ruling-trump-cant-end-daca/.
21. Josh Blackman, Immigration Inside the Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 31,
37 (2015).
22. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 760 n.86 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
23. Stephen H. Legomsky, Written Testimony of Stephen H. Legomsky
Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 16–18
(Feb. 25, 2015), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/
Legomsky-Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Legomsky Testimony].
24. Blackman, supra note 21, at 37.
25. Josh Blackman, DACA Recipient, Detained by ICE, Asserts 5th
Amendment Violation for “Break[ing] the Promise Made to Him” Because
of Grant of Lawful Presence, J OSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Feb. 14, 2017),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/02/14/daca-recipient-detained-byice-asserts-5th-amendment-violation-for-breaking-the-promise-made-to-himbecause-of-grant-of-lawful-presence/. The State of Washington is not a party
to the case Professor Blackman describes; the plaintiff there is an individual
DACA recipient challenging his detention. See Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus at 2, Ramirez Medina v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:17-cv05110 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2017). I am assuming Professor Blackman is
referring to the suit brought by the State of Washington to enjoin President
Trump’s travel ban. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief,
Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017).
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standing argument it had once opposed.26 The argument that it
opposed in Texas v. United States was that Texas had standing by
virtue of the administrative costs it would incur in processing
driver license applications filed by DAPA recipients.27 That
position bears no resemblance to Washington’s asserted grounds
for standing in its own challenge to President Trump’s travel
ban—that the ban “is separating Washington families, harming
thousands of Washington residents, damaging Washington’s
economy, hurting Washington-based companies, and undermining
Washington’s sovereign interest in remaining a welcoming place
for immigrants and refugees.”28 Whether or not one finds those
interests sufficient for standing, they have nothing to do with the
argument that Washington opposed in the Texas litigation.
In the same paragraph, Professor Blackman cites what he
similarly believes is an inconsistency in the arguments of
immigrant advocates: “The 5th Circuit [in the Texas litigation]
found that the conferral of lawful presence made the policy illegal.
Now, the [pro-DACA] lawyers are relying on that conclusion to
bootstrap a claim that DACA is now a constitutionally protected
interest—albeit an illegal one.”29
That characterization misstates the arguments of the
challengers’ lawyers. Yes, they rely partly on DACA’s conferral of
lawful presence.30 But if Professor Blackman is suggesting that
this reliance contradicts a position that other immigrant
advocates took in defending DAPA against Texas’s earlier
challenge, the inconsistency is not apparent. No DACA supporter
of whom I am aware has ever disputed that deferred action gives
rise to lawful presence. Nor could they; the memo creating DAPA
expressly says it does.31 So Professor Blackman’s assertion seems
to be, rather, that the DACA supporters are relying not just on the
creation of lawful presence, but on the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion
that the conferral of lawful presence makes DAPA illegal.32 But
any argument that illegality is what gives the plaintiffs’ interests
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
1, at 2.
32.

See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
Texas, 787 F.3d at 748–54.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 25, at 1–2.
Blackman, supra note 25.
See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 25, at 11.
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, supra note
See Blackman, supra note 25.
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constitutional protection would surely be a nonsequitur. For that
reason alone, it is not surprising that the DACA supporters
nowhere offer such a theory. And if Professor Blackman means
only to suggest that the DACA supporters are relying on the
conferral of lawful presence despite the Fifth Circuit’s holding, the
obvious answer is that the district court in Washington is not
bound by the Fifth Circuit’s controversial holding, one that we can
safely assume the lawyers challenging the legality of the
rescission do not share in any event. They would be on firm
ground in resisting the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion. As I have
argued elsewhere, DACA and DAPA are well within the legal
authority of the executive branch, the Fifth Circuit’s poorlyreasoned 2–1 panel decision notwithstanding.33 At any rate, the
pro-DACA lawyers’ argument that DACA confers lawful presence
was not their principal argument; their main point was that, apart
from lawful presence, DACA creates a “reasonable expectation”
which, under current case law, can establish a constitutionally
protected interest.34 They additionally assert a constitutionally
protected interest in being free from imprisonment.35 For these
many reasons, the claimed inconsistencies simply do not exist.
Let us be clear about one fundamental fact: the specific legal
issues in the litigation challenging DACA and DAPA have almost
nothing relevant in common with the legal issues in either the
travel ban litigation or the DACA rescission litigation. In the
litigation challenging DAPA, the legal issues were whether Texas
had standing based on its alleged expenses in processing driver
licenses;36 whether DAPA violated the general overall spirit of the
Immigration and Nationality Act;37 and whether DAPA contained
too little discretion to be exempt from the notice-and-comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.38 In the travel
33. Legomsky Testimony, supra note 23, at 2–26.
34. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 25, at 3–4.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 747–54 (5th Cir. 2015).
37. Id. at 754.
38. Id. at 762–67. Texas also argued that, in issuing DAPA, President
Obama had breached his constitutional duty to “take [c]are that the laws be
faithfully executed.” Id. at 746 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). That
argument, however, was superfluous. The only laws that Texas claimed the
President had failed to execute faithfully were the immigration laws. Id.
Either the President’s actions were consistent with the immigration laws, in
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ban litigation, the issues required interpretation of a statutory
provision empowering the President to ban classes of noncitizens;
interpretation of another statutory provision barring specified
forms of nationality discrimination; a fact question as to whether
the travel ban had been motivated largely by animus toward
Muslims; and a question as to whether—if such animus were
found—the action would violate the constitutional prohibition on
the establishment of religion.39 Finally, in the challenge to
President Trump’s rescission of DACA, the issues were whether
the rescission order was unconstitutionally motivated by antiMexican animus;40 whether it would violate due process for the
Administration to divert to enforcement purposes the information
voluntarily provided by the DACA applicants;41 whether the
rescission was “arbitrary and capricious”;42 and whether the
rescission order required use of the notice-and-comment
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and an impact
analysis under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.43 The legal
arguments made by immigrant advocates in the litigation
challenging DAPA thus had little or no connection to those made
in either the travel ban or the DACA rescission litigation.44
The only commonality we are left with is that all these
challenges were to bold executive actions that affect large
numbers of people. At that level of generality, the similarity is
which case there were no laws that he had failed to execute faithfully, or his
actions were inconsistent with the immigration laws, in which case that
statutory violation alone would render the policy unlawful. Either way,
therefore, the constitutional claim is simply a restatement of the statutory
argument.
39. See Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 673–75, 683–97, 702 (9th Cir.
2017), cert. granted, No. 17-965, 2018 WL 324357 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2018);
Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 650–51, 655–57 (9th Cir. 2017).
40. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2–3, 52, New York
v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-05228 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2017).
41. Id. at 3, 52–53.
42. Id. at 53.
43. Id. at 54–55.
44.
One qualification is necessary. As just noted, both the DAPA
challenge and the challenge to the rescission of DACA presented notice-andcomment issues. But those issues were not the same. In the former, the
question was whether DAPA contained enough discretion to bring it within
the statutory exemption for “general statements of policy.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(A) (2016). Whether the rescission left room for administrative
discretion was not an issue in the latter case.
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unhelpful. The critics’ claims of inconsistency—and thus the
suggestions that defense of a bold pro-immigrant initiative will
later support an equally bold anti-immigrant initiative—rest
simplistically on a false equivalence.
A separate line of argument goes beyond immigration.
Upholding DACA and DAPA, some fear, would provide legal
clearance for future (now present) conservative Presidents to
refuse to enforce a whole battery of laws they personally dislike.
The parade of horribles has included refusals to enforce the laws
on health care, taxes, the environment, voting rights, and
employment discrimination.45
These fears seem misplaced. I have no doubt that
conservative Presidents could be tempted to do some or all of those
things. President Trump is the best evidence that the fear of a
conservative President dismantling important regulatory
protections is real. But DACA and DAPA are not the culprits that
could supply the legal ammunition for such actions. To suggest
otherwise would require at least two logical leaps.
First, neither DACA nor DAPA entails non-enforcement of the
immigration laws. The resources Congress has appropriated for
immigration enforcement, while massive,46 are still not enough to
go after more than a very small fraction, roughly 4%, of the
current undocumented population.47 DACA and DAPA reflect
nothing more than determinations that the populations these
programs address are exceptionally low removal priorities and
that, given the policy decision not to pursue their removal, there
are strong reasons to grant them deferred action and temporary
work permits.48 No one has suggested that the Obama
45.
See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, A slippery slope on immigration, WASH. POST
(Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-aslippery-slope-on-immigration/2014/11/18/501a11b0-6f5b-11e4-893f86bd390a3340_story.html?utm_term=.3dff1db8f6de (citing the similar
concerns of Professor David Martin, see infra note 57); Frustration over
stalled immigration action doesn’t mean Obama can act unilaterally, WASH.
POST (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/frustrationover-stalled-immigration-action-doesnt-mean-obama-can-actunilaterally/2014/08/05/9c7bc1c6-1c1c-11e4-ae540cfe1f974f8a_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4f9dddc98d33.
46.
See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
47.
See Legomsky Testimony, supra note 23, at 3.
48.
See id. at 29 (summarizing the policy rationales for DAPA and
DACA).
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Administration failed to fully use the immigration enforcement
resources that Congress provided.
Still, some might protest, even if upholding DACA and DAPA
would not authorize complete non-enforcement of other laws, it
would at least authorize partial non-enforcement. But even that
is not true, for several reasons. First and foremost, every
statutory system is different. In particular, they differ with
respect to the degree of discretion that Congress has delegated to
the relevant government agency. As just discussed, the litigation
over the validity of DAPA turned on whether it violated the
immigration laws (and the notice-and-comment provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act).49 A judicial precedent holding
that DACA and DAPA are consistent with the immigration laws
would tell us nothing about whether some other, hypothetical
executive action is authorized by the environmental laws, or the
civil rights laws, or the tax laws.
In addition, the executive branch has only whatever
enforcement resources Congress has given it. Unlike the case
with DACA and DAPA, a future Administration would be on
thinner legal ice if it refused to use even the resources it had.
Among other things, such actions would invite serious questions
as to whether the Administration is complying with the terms of
the relevant appropriations Act.50 As with the feared immigrationrelated actions, these hypothetically extreme executive actions in
other far-flung areas of the law would require their own
independent legal support. DACA and DAPA are distinguishable
in too many ways.
II. POLITICAL NORMS

Legal issues aside, Professor Eric Posner worried that DAPA
may modify political norms that control what the
president can do . . . . Obama’s defenders thus argued
that Republicans shouldn’t complain about his deferredaction plan because presidents George H.W. Bush and
Ronald
Reagan
also
deferred
action
against
undocumented immigrants. Critics of Obama’s action
worry that it establishes a broader political norm that
49.
50.

5 U.S.C. § 553.
See Legomsky Testimony, supra note 23, at 3–4.
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enables the president to achieve, through
enforcement, ends unrelated to immigration.51

non-

Professor Posner then offered examples of regulatory
constraints that a conservative future President might be tempted
to neutralize through non-enforcement—financial regulation,
Obamacare, climate regulation, and antitrust regulation.52
Written before the election of Donald Trump, Professor Posner’s
warning might seem prescient at first glance.
He is quite right that supporters of DACA and DAPA have
drawn political support from the eerily similar “Family Fairness”
policies of Presidents Reagan and Bush.53 But that sole example
of one President citing a predecessor’s prosecutorial discretion in
support of his own policy is overstated. The fact that Presidents
Reagan and Bush had adopted analogous policies several decades
earlier was only one of the many arguments in support of DACA
and DAPA.54 As a member of the Obama Administration
integrally involved in the rollout and implementation of DACA, I
can attest firsthand that this point was not a sine qua non for the
President’s decision. Immigrant advocacy organizations can claim
the lion’s share of the credit for that. The reference to the
Reagan/Bush policy was merely a makeweight; there is no doubt
that the policy would have been issued even without analogous
programs in the 1980s. Moreover, there was no DACA and no
DAPA when Presidents Reagan and Bush announced their
programs.55 They did not need precedential political norms to do
so. Neither did President Obama.
But suppose it were otherwise. Suppose the political norms
that underlay the Family Fairness policy of Presidents Reagan and
Bush had been critical to President Obama’s political capacity to
create DACA and DAPA. All of those policies protected classes of
undocumented immigrants from imminent deportation. How any
51. Eric A. Posner, Obama’s Immigration Order Is a Gift to Future
REPUBLIC
(Nov.
23,
2014),
Republican
Presidents,
NEW
https://newrepublic.com/article/120382/obamas-immigration-executive-ordergift-republican-presidents.
52. Id.
53. Legomsky Testimony, supra note 23, at 23, 25.
54. See id. at 2–29.
55. DACA and DAPA were announced in 2012 and 2014, respectively.
See supra notes 1 and 2.
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of those policies establish or even solidify political norms that
would legitimize anti-immigrant executive actions is not apparent.
To the best of my knowledge, no one in the Trump Administration
cited DACA and DAPA as precedents that support President
Trump’s authority to impose a travel ban, or to rescind DACA, or
to dismantle any non-immigration-related regulatory regimes.
Nor could they.
And that is my main objection—the effortlessness with which
the various naysayers have assumed causation. Those who assert
these claims are making a causal assumption that they should
have some obligation to demonstrate rather than just assert. I
will add one rhetorical question: Does anyone really believe that,
if only President Obama had not established DACA and DAPA,
President Trump would have zealously enforced the Affordable
Care Act and the environmental laws?
III. PUBLIC BACKLASH

A third sort of “be careful what you wish for” argument
encompasses executive actions like DACA and DAPA but takes a
more generic form. The notion is that liberal immigration policies
serve only to spur a public political backlash that in turn will
create an opening for future repressive legislation or executive
action.56
Along those lines, at least one highly-respected scholar has
argued that immigrant advocates need to support strong law
enforcement measures as a prerequisite to achieving
humanitarian reforms.57 But there are reasons that immigrant
56. See, e.g., James F. Hollifield, Valerie F. Hunt & Daniel J. Tichenor,
Immigrants, Markets, and Rights: The United States as an Emerging
Migration State, 27 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 7, 14 (2008) (“If too many foreigners
reside on the national territory, it may become difficult for a state to identify
its population vis-à-vis other states. The national community may feel
threatened, and there may be a social or political backlash against
immigration.”); Jake Lichter, Mode IV and the Future of a Liberalized Global
Immigration Policy, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 187, 193 (2012) (“[L]ower wages
[from foreign competition] will come at a benefit to producers, but the
possible backlash created on a domestic level among citizens may be severe.
If immigration were to be truly liberalized it could become impossible for
governments to protect against the problems associated with social
dumping.”).
57. David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement is Not Just for Restrictionists:
Building a Stable and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L. &
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advocates have not prioritized, or even shown affirmative support
for, still more enforcement. One reason is that excessive law
enforcement can produce cruel outcomes.58
The other reason is the already-bloated immigration
enforcement budget. The numbers are staggering: The Border
Patrol budget is now more than fourteen times what it was in
1990.59 The ICE interior enforcement operations budget has
tripled since 2004.60 From 1986 to 1996, the interval between the
passage of two major immigration enforcement laws,61 the
number of Border Patrol agents doubled; that number doubled
again from 1996 to the attacks of September 11 in 2001, and it
doubled yet again in the decade following the 9/11 attacks.62 We
now spend more money on immigration enforcement than is spent
by “all other principal federal criminal law enforcement agencies
combined.”63
Yet, even with these continual exponential increases in
POLS. 411, 412–26 (2015).
58. See Vivian Yee & Caitlin Dickerson, 10-Year-Old Immigrant Is
Detained After Agents Stop Her on Way to Surgery, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/us/girl-cerebral-palsy-detainedimmigration.html?_r=0 (recounting the highly publicized case of Rosa Maria
Hernandez).
59. The Cost of Immigration Enforcement and Border Security, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL, Jan. 25, 2017, at 2, https://www.americanimmigration
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enforcement resources, immigrant advocates overwhelmingly
advocated zealously for the comprehensive immigration reform
(CIR) bill that the Senate passed in 2013—a bill that would have
more than doubled the size of the Border Patrol yet again,64 added
much more border fence,65 and required other border fortification
measures.66 It would have made the automated employment
verification system known as E-Verify mandatory for all
employers,67 and it would have adopted a wide range of other
interior enforcement measures.68 Immigrant advocates were not
intransigent about any of those provisions. They accepted these
massive enforcement measures as a tradeoff for legalization and
increases in legal immigration. It is true that we liberals have
generally resisted calls for turning state and local police into
junior immigration agents, as well as calls to punish so-called
sanctuary cities, but out of important concerns that in fact are
shared by many law enforcement professionals.69
Just as DACA and DAPA created neither legal nor political
norms that somehow legitimize anti-immigrant executive actions
like the travel ban, then, I see no evidence that DACA and DAPA
are responsible for a public political backlash against immigrants.
Nor is there evidence of a more specific causal link between either
DACA or DAPA and President Trump’s travel ban or any of his
anti-regulatory executive actions.
64. MARC R. ROSENBLUM & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43097, COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM IN THE 113TH CONGRESS:
MAJOR PROVISIONS IN SENATE-PASSED S. 744, at 8 (2013) (the bill would have
required 38,405 trained full-time active duty U.S. Border Patrol agents
deployed, stationed, and maintained along the Southern border); see also LISA
SEGHETTI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42138, BORDER SECURITY: IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 13 (2014) (as of January 2013, there
were 18,462 stationed along the Southwestern border).
65. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 5 (as passed by Senate, June 27,
2013).
66. See, e.g., id. §§ 1101–1102(c).
67. Id. § 3101.
68. Id. §§ 3104–3306, 3701–21.
69. Jasmine C. Lee et al., What Are Sanctuary Cities?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuarycities.html (“Many local law enforcement officials favor the [sanctuary]
policies, saying they do not want the job of enforcing federal immigration
laws. They say they rely on immigrants in their communities to come
forward to report crimes.”).
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It is easy to hypothesize that the Obama executive actions
have made possible a range of extreme conservative nonenforcement actions, either by setting dangerous legal precedents
or by altering existing political norms. But coming up with actual
evidence of any but-for causal connection is harder. If it exists, I
have yet to see it.
CONCLUSION

The gist of these various criticisms has been that those of us
who have defended either the legality or the wisdom of DACA and
DAPA, or who have advocated for other progressive immigration
policies, have painted ourselves into a corner. The notion is that
we have unwittingly laid the legal and political groundwork for a
broad executive power to do cruel things to immigrants. In some
of these criticisms there is even the subtle inference that we
immigrant advocates have exposed ourselves as hypocrites—and
short-sighted hypocrites at that—when we now question the
wisdom and the legality of President Trump’s executive actions on
immigration.
Of course, if it is hypocrisy to make one argument for the
purpose of defending DACA and DAPA and later resist an
analogous argument for broad executive power, then it is just as
hypocritical to challenge the legality of DACA and DAPA and then
later assert that same argument the moment it helps support
anti-immigrant executive actions. What is sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander. But I want to get beyond the name-calling,
not just because name-calling is unhelpful, but because, as this
article demonstrates, neither side is being inconsistent, much less
hypocritical. Both the legal and the policy analyses of the various
challenged actions are simply different.
To be clear, I do not suggest that no pro-immigrant policy
could possibly spawn an anti-immigrant backlash. My suggestion
is more modest. I see no evidence that the kinds of positions that
critics have recently been faulting liberals for advocating—support
for DACA and DAPA, opposition to the travel ban and to the
DACA rescission and to the severe reduction in refugee
admissions at a time when the needs of the world’s refugees have
never been greater—have contributed in any way to any of the
extreme anti-immigrant measures recently adopted or proposed.
To the contrary, I predict that public opinion will ultimately—and
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it might take time—force the reversal of at least some of these
policies.
So I say that we immigrant advocates should follow our own
instincts, rather than be guided by what our critics tell us our
strategies should be. And that means we should continue to fight
tooth and nail for immigrants and refugees and for all the values
that we ourselves believe in.

